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Policy Forum
S
urveillance, according to the 
World Health Organization 
(WHO), “is the cornerstone 
of public health security” [1]. In 
many developing countries, human, 
laboratory, and infrastructure 
limitations impede effective 
surveillance [2–5]. Such countries 
likely do not meet core surveillance 
and response capacities under the new 
International Health Regulations (IHR 
2005) [6], which require detection 
of elevated disease and death rates, 
immediate implementation of control 
measures, and reporting to WHO of 
any event that may constitute a public 
health emergency of international 
concern [7]. (The previous IHR 
covered only cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever.)
In some high-income countries, 
“syndromic surveillance,” a novel 
approach, uses pre-diagnostic data and 
statistical algorithms to detect epidemics 
earlier than traditional surveillance, 
including unusual diseases with 
nonspeciﬁc presentations [8–10] (Box 
1). Syndromic surveillance also supports 
public health “situational awareness” 
[11,12], which means monitoring the 
effectiveness of epidemic responses and 
characterizing affected populations. 
Despite obstacles to implementation 
in resource-limited settings, the tools 
and strategies of syndromic surveillance 
hold promise for improving public 
health security in developing countries. 
Successful applications show that the 
obstacles can be overcome.
Potential Utility in Developing 
Countries
Syndromic surveillance offers a 
useful adjunct to diagnosis-based 
surveillance of emerging infections in 
developing countries. Where laboratory 
conﬁrmation is not routinely used, 
syndromes associated with diseases 
of public health importance, such as 
inﬂuenza-like illness caused by multiple 
epidemic-prone tropical infections, 
could indicate outbreaks requiring 
laboratory-based investigation and 
control. Also, syndromic surveillance 
can identify outbreaks that do not 
fall into pre-established diagnostic 
categories, a capability essential for 
prompt control of new or changing 
diseases.
Another potential contribution 
of the syndromic surveillance ﬁeld 
to developing countries is objective, 
automated approaches for detecting 
unusual morbidity trends, which could 
strengthen monitoring of syndromes, 
diagnoses, and other health-related 
data. Usually, these approaches involve 
entry of patient data into a computer, 
followed by (1) automatic, periodic 
application of statistical algorithms 
comparing the data to non-outbreak 
expectations (trends that depart from 
expectations by a predeﬁned statistical 
threshold indicate possible outbreaks), 
and (2) visualization tools. 
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Box 1. Overview of Syndromic 
Surveillance Systems
Purpose
• Detect outbreaks earlier than possible 
with traditional surveillance
• Situational awareness (e.g., monitoring 
outbreak distribution and spread, 
characterizing affected populations)
Features
• “Indicator” (pre-diagnostic) data 
(e.g., syndromes, medication sales, 
absenteeism, patient chief complaints)
• Automated or partially automated data 
acquisition and analysis 
• Statistical algorithms to detect 
unexpected elevations in indicator 
data
• Near-real-time data acquisition and 
analysis
• Computerized tools for visualizing data 
and analysis results 
Synonymous terms (modiﬁed from [10])
• Outbreak detection systems
• Early warning systems
• Health indicator surveillance
• Prodromal surveillancePLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0368 March 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 3  |  e72
Objective criteria for identifying 
possible outbreaks complement 
subjective assessment, often the sole 
guide in developing settings, in two 
important ways. First, they can prevent 
unwitting bias, as in failing to account 
for readily explainable data behavior. 
For example, statistical algorithms 
can draw on historical data to remove 
effects of weekly clinic utilization cycles 
or seasonal disease cycles, uncovering 
unusual events that could reﬂect new 
or changing pathogens.
Second, objective procedures 
provide uniformity across health 
care facilities and personnel working 
separate departments or shifts within 
facilities. Without standardized 
approaches for identifying unusual 
health events, facility-level factors, 
such as the training, experience, and 
competing clinical responsibilities of 
personnel, inﬂuence the decision to 
notify higher authorities of potential 
outbreaks. Local notiﬁcation protocols 
may vary markedly within decentralized 
Ministries of Health, which are 
common across developing countries.
Computer-based automation of 
routine data analysis is helpful because, 
with multiple reporting units and 
reportable events, the number of 
graphs or charts to inspect at public 
health ofﬁces likely exceeds the 
capacity of public health personnel 
(especially considering the competing 
responsibilities in short-staffed ofﬁces). 
The problem can be greatest during 
outbreaks—when thorough, rapid 
data assessment is critical for gauging 
outbreak extent and trajectory—as 
control activities take precedence.
Syndromic surveillance systems 
typically use computerized visualization 
tools to display algorithm results 
and morbidity trends [13–16]. Many 
software packages generate time-
series graphs, maps, and data tables 
that are required routinely, and allow 
the user to produce other displays 
(e.g., focusing on speciﬁc age groups, 
surveillance sites, or syndromes) 
as needed. Tables and graphs 
summarizing key data and algorithm 
outputs, arranged to ﬁt into a single 
computer screen view, can efﬁciently 
focus the user’s attention on potential 
outbreaks.
Reason for Optimism
There is cause for optimism that 
syndromic surveillance approaches 
can feasibly be adapted to developing 
settings. First, they ﬁt naturally with 
and could enhance existing strategies 
for outbreak detection and situational 
awareness in tropical areas. For 
example, with the goal of containing 
epidemics within two weeks of onset, 
WHO and African countries are 
implementing Malaria Early Warning 
Systems that use health data and 
climatology to forecast and detect 
epidemics [17]. Pre-diagnostic data 
have been evaluated as indicators for 
dengue outbreaks in French Polynesia 
[18], French Guiana [19], Puerto Rico 
[20], and elsewhere.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050072.g001
Figure 1. Internet and Telephone Access in Developing Countries 
Adapted from [22]. 
Table 1. Technology for Health Data Capture and Transmission in Remote Areas
Data Capture 
Technology
Data Transmission Pros Cons Acquisition Cost (US$)a
Laptop—regular USB ﬂash drive (store and carry), 
dial-up modem, wireless modem, 
voice-over-IP
Captures detailed data, battery-
powered, built-in networking
May be hard to replace broken 
parts, theft risk
$400
Laptop—special for 
developing areasb
Durable, energy-efﬁcient, some self-
powered (e.g., hand-crank)
Cons of regular laptop + limited 
functionality
$200
Cell phone Voice/interactive voice response, 
texting, key entry
Inexpensive, cellular infrastructure 
ubiquitous globally
Entering detailed data may be 
difﬁcult
$40
PDA Laptop features Captures data at point-of-care, some 
have intuitive interface
Entering detailed data may be 
difﬁcult
$100
Smartphone Cell phone and PDA features Pros of cell phone and PDA Entering detailed data may be 
difﬁcult
$100–$400
Satellite phone Cell phone features, Internet Global service Must be outdoors, calls short and 
expensive
$1400
aApproximate retail cost for basic models. Recurring costs, such as software licensing fees, are not included. 
bFor example, the XO Laptop by the One Laptop Per Child project (http://laptop.org/) and the Classmate PC by Intel (http://www.intel.com/intel/worldahead/classmatepc/).
IP, Internet protocol; PDA, personal digital assistant; USB, universal serial bus.
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Second, while existing electronic 
health data are unavailable in some 
developing areas, many Ministries 
of Health already require reporting 
of data that have proven useful for 
syndromic surveillance in high-income 
countries, such as International 
Classiﬁcation of Diseases codes. 
Adapting strategies for grouping 
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases 
codes into syndromes representing 
priority diseases, as done in syndromic 
surveillance systems in the United 
States [21], could facilitate syndromic 
surveillance in resource-limited settings 
without requiring collection of new 
data.
Third, expanding access to 
communication networks and 
technology will facilitate rapid 
electronic data entry, reporting, and 
analysis in resource-limited areas. 
Between 2000 and 2005, Internet 
access improved more than 4-fold in 
developing countries, and more than 
one quarter of the developing world 
uses mobile phones (Figure 1) [22], 
making these especially promising tools 
for timely transmission of surveillance 
data. As costs decrease and network 
availability improves, laptop computers, 
personal digital assistants, and other 
technologies may increasingly ﬁnd 
application in developing country 
surveillance systems (Table 1). 
Fourth, syndromic surveillance 
initiatives could dovetail with other 
efforts to improve health information 
systems. For example, the WHO-led 
Health Metrics Network, launched in 
2005, aims to increase the availability 
and use of timely and accurate 
health information by catalyzing 
the joint funding and development 
of core country health information 
systems [23]. Though concerned 
with a range of health information 
systems (including vital registration, 
health surveys, disease surveillance, 
and others), its efforts to develop 
standards, as well as data management 
and analytic capacities, could lay 
essential groundwork for application of 
syndromic surveillance methods.
Results from Existing Systems in 
Developing Countries
Some developing countries have 
overcome resource constraints to 
establish effective electronic syndromic 
surveillance systems. The Indonesian 
Ministry of Health, together with a US 
laboratory it hosts in Jakarta, Naval 
Medical Research Unit-2, developed 
a simple but ﬂexible syndromic 
surveillance system, Early Warning 
Outbreak Recognition System 
(EWORS), in 1998. For patients 
presenting to selected provincial 
hospitals, data on 29 signs and 
symptoms are collected and analyzed 
daily. Health authorities have used 
EWORS to detect outbreaks of dengue, 
diarrhea, inﬂuenza-like illness, and 
many other diseases.
For example, in 2002, EWORS 
facilitated detection and control 
of a diarrhea outbreak following 
a severe ﬂood in Jakarta (Figure 
2). A sentinel site in North Jakarta 
municipality reported above-average 
counts of watery diarrhea with other 
symptoms indicating moderate-
to-severe disease in January, when 
heavy rains caused ﬂooding with 
contamination of water sources. The 
ﬁrst alert of a signiﬁcant increase in 
cases, generated by an automated 
statistical detection algorithm, occurred 
during the second week of January. An 
outbreak investigation was initiated, 
including rectal swab sampling of 
patients with watery diarrhea. Culture 
tests identiﬁed Vibrio cholerae in 44 
of 47 specimens collected, as well 
as Salmonella and Shigella. Health 
authorities implemented interventions 
immediately, including provision 
of clean water to ﬂood-affected 
populations and rehydration for 
diarrhea patients; case counts returned 
to baseline levels by late February.
In 2007, the Ministry of Health, 
through three of its subordinate 
organizations (National Institute of 
Health Research and Development, 
Directorate General of Disease 
Control and Environmental Health, 
and Directorate General of Medical 
Service), ofﬁcially adopted EWORS 
as a national surveillance system. The 
Ministry of Health plans to expand 
EWORS to many more hospitals 
throughout Indonesia, and to include 
its implementation as a criterion for 
hospital accreditation. To enhance 
EWORS syndromic surveillance with 
laboratory validation, eight laboratories 
in Indonesia have been designated as 
regional reference centers that support 
outbreak investigations.
In Peru, the Directorate of 
Epidemiology (part of the Ministry of 
Health), supported by a US laboratory 
in Lima, the Naval Medical Research 
Center Detachment, implemented a 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050072.g002
Figure 2. Post-Flooding Diarrhea Outbreak in Jakarta, Indonesia, January–February 2002 
X-axis labels are week/month, from the 44th week of 2001 (in November) to the 9th week of 2002 
(in February). The blue line shows the number of cases per week reporting to an EWORS site in 
Jakarta with watery diarrhea and dehydration, fever, or vomiting. The “Cusum” (cumulative sum) 
C1, C2, and C3 alerts identify, with increasing sensitivity, signiﬁcant increases in case counts using 
the Early Aberration Reporting System [27]. The horizontal red solid and broken lines represent the 
long-term mean and mean plus two standard deviations (sometimes used as an outbreak detection 
threshold in other surveillance systems), respectively.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0370 March 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 3  |  e72
system modeled on EWORS in 2005 
at two public health centers on the 
country’s northern border. Following a 
favorable evaluation in 2006, the system 
was expanded to several sites in Lima, 
where detection of dengue outbreaks 
is of high concern (autochthonous 
dengue fever transmission was reported 
in Lima in 2005 for the ﬁrst time in 
more than 60 years, but has not been 
detected since). 
The US laboratory in Lima also 
partnered with the Peruvian Navy 
and Voxiva to develop the Alerta 
surveillance system in 2002 to monitor 
reportable events in sailors and 
their families. Alerta allows real-time 
data transmission by mobile phone, 
text messaging, or Internet from 
units across the country, including 
remote Amazon bases and ships. 
Alerta has identiﬁed many outbreaks 
and facilitated rapid laboratory 
conﬁrmation by response teams 
equipped with ﬁeld-use diagnostic tests 
or by central laboratories. 
For example, in 2005, Alerta 
identiﬁed two diarrhea outbreaks at a 
Peruvian Navy training base in Lima 
[24]. Prompt investigations identiﬁed 
Cyclospora cayetanensis as the cause of 
both outbreaks, leading to appropriate 
treatment (cotrimoxazole or empiric 
ﬂuorquinolone), investigation of 
food and water sources and meal 
preparation, and an epidemiological 
study to test a hypothesis about the 
incidence of C. cayetanensis infection in 
the local population. There have been 
no further large outbreaks of diarrhea 
at this training base.
Implementation
Syndromic surveillance tools and 
approaches are not appropriate for all 
developing settings. Where no health 
data are routinely collected, developing 
basic surveillance capacities [25], 
including laboratory-based surveillance, 
should be a high priority for local and 
national health authorities. Where 
electronic syndromic surveillance 
systems may be feasible, a combination 
of technical, ﬁnancial, political, 
ethical, cultural, and societal factors 
all may contribute to successful 
implementation and should be 
considered from the outset of planning 
(Box 2).
The role of technical partnerships 
focusing on software, hardware, 
and analytical methods is especially 
important. While the need for 
improved outbreak detection and 
situational awareness is greatest in 
developing settings, most syndromic 
surveillance applications have been 
used in high-income countries. 
Technical partnerships involving 
research laboratories, public health 
agencies, and other organizations 
could bridge this gap, and should 
aim to foster lasting capacity for 
system development, operation, and 
improvement.
An example of such a collaboration 
includes epidemiologists and 
information technology specialists 
from Indonesia, Peru, and the Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory, who partnered to learn 
from experience with EWORS and 
Alerta and consult on further system 
improvement. In September 2007, 
they joined colleagues from other 
developing countries with experience 
or interest in syndromic surveillance 
to develop an informal professional 
network, and identify common 
surveillance needs and possible 
solutions (https://secwww.jhuapl.edu/
dsw/index.htm). The International 
Society for Disease Surveillance 
(http://www.syndromic.org/), which 
has a strong syndromic surveillance 
focus, provides another forum for 
Table 2. Strategic and Operational Surveillance Planning: Key Activities for Syndromic Surveillance Systems
System Components Elements Activities
Priorities Prioritization exercise u Identify priority diseases for rapid detection and tracking
u Establish timely detection and situational awareness as surveillance priorities
System structure IHR (2005) implementation u Educate stakeholders on requirements for epidemic detection, characterization, reporting
u Assess capacity to meet requirements
u Assess potential role for electronic surveillance in strengthening existing capacity
Surveillance strategy u Deﬁne electronic surveillance objectives 
u Develop strategic plan to meet the objectives
System organization u Establish technical partnerships (South–South, South–North, multilateral)
Intersectoral collaboration u Establish collaboration with informatics-related programs and ofﬁces 
Coordination & integration u Use the electronic system to integrate and streamline other existing systems
Core functions Case detection u Ensure system has ﬂexibility to modify case deﬁnition in data capture and analysis phases
u Deﬁne thresholds for epidemic alerts
Conﬁrmation u Deﬁne criteria and procedures for initiating laboratory-based conﬁrmation for alerts
Reporting u Install communication systems appropriate for infrastructure, budget, and timeliness goals
u Establish paths for information ﬂow
Data analysis & interpretation u Introduce software that meets user needs (commercial, freeware, or novel)
u Develop protocols for routine data analysis
Support functions Training u Perform needs assessment for training in system operation
u Provide initial and periodic refresher training for system operators
Resources u Provide hardware and software
u Establish plan for updating and replacing hardware and software
u Identify and train technical support unit 
Monitoring & evaluation u Adapt and apply standard guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems
Advocacy u Conduct stakeholder advocacy to maintain support for the system
Surveillance quality Timeliness, completeness, usefulness, 
other aspects
u Seek feedback from operators, technical partners, and others to identify interventions that
 improve quality and analyze before-after or intervention site-control site effects
Adapted from [28].
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international syndromic surveillance 
partnerships.
Planning a new syndromic 
surveillance system requires special 
attention to some of the issues 
usually considered in surveillance 
system planning (Table 2). For 
example, procedures for developing, 
maintaining, and evaluating proﬁciency 
with new technologies, and for 
replacing or repairing failing hardware, 
must be established. As with any new 
surveillance effort, the system should, 
to the extent possible, be integrated 
into existing reporting pathways. 
Wider Beneﬁts
By helping to rapidly detect and 
characterize unusual morbidity trends, 
syndromic surveillance holds promise 
as an early line of defense against new 
and emerging infections in developing 
settings. Considering the poor state 
of public health surveillance in those 
areas, syndromic surveillance tools 
and approaches may provide greater 
additional beneﬁt than in high-income 
countries that already have other types 
of effective surveillance programs. 
But implementation of syndromic 
surveillance tools and approaches 
may have wider public health 
beneﬁts. Hardware, software, and 
communication infrastructure 
for timely outbreak detection and 
situational awareness could strengthen 
data collection, reporting, and 
interpretation for other public health 
programs (e.g., evaluating interventions 
and identifying resource needs). 
Perhaps most importantly, investing in 
human resources—through training in 
epidemiology, data management and 
analysis, use of computers, and other 
public health skills—would help address 
an important threat to public health 
security in developing countries.  
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